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 Orange Juice and Weather
 By RICHARD ROLL*
 Frozen concentrated orange juice is an
 unusual commodity. It is concentrated not
 only hydrologically, but also geographically;
 more than 98 percent of U.S. production
 takes place in the central Florida region
 around Orlando.' Weather is a major in-
 fluence on orange juice production and un-
 like commodities such as corn and oats, which
 are produced over wide geographical areas,
 orange juice output is influenced primarily
 by the weather at a single location. This
 suggests that frozen concentrated orange juice
 is a relatively good candidate for a study of
 the interaction between prices and a truly
 exogenous determinant of value, the weather.
 The relevant weather for OJ production is
 easy to measure. It is reported accurately and
 consistently by a well-organized federal
 agency, the National Weather Service of the
 Department of Commerce. Forecasts of
 weather are provided by the same agency
 and this makes it possible to assess the pre-
 dictive ability of OJ futures prices against a
 rather exacting standard.
 Geographic concentration is the most im-
 portant attribute of orange juice for our em-
 pirical purposes, but the commodity also
 possesses other convenient features. It seems
 unlikely to be sensitive to nonweather in-
 fluences on supply and demand. For exam-
 ple, although the commodity is frozen and
 not very perishable, only a small amount is
 carried over in inventory from one year to
 the next. During 1978, for example, inven-
 tory declined to about 20 percent of the
 year's "pack" of new juice.2
 Data on short-term variability in demand
 are nonexistent, but there is little reason to
 suspect much. Orange juice demand might
 very well respond to price variation in sub-
 stitutes such as, say, apple juice; but national
 income and tastes probably do not fluctuate
 enough to explain a significant part of the
 daily OJ juice movement3 (which is substan-
 tial, as we shall see).
 Short-term variations in supply induced
 by planting decision must also be quite low
 because of the nature of the product. Oranges
 grow on trees that require five to fifteen years
 *Graduate School of Management, University of
 California, Los Angeles, CA 90024. I am grateful for
 discussions with Eugene Fama and Stephen Ross, for
 comments on an earlier draft by Gordon Alexander,
 Thomas Copeland, Michael Darby, David Mayers,
 Huston McCulloch, and Sheridan Titman, for the coop-
 eration of Paul Polger of the National Oceanographic
 and Atmospheric Administration, and for comments in
 seminars from the finance faculties of the universities of
 British Columbia, Alberta, and Illinois. Kathy Gillies
 provided excellent research assistance. Financial assis-
 tance was provided by Allstate, the Center for Research
 in Financial Markets and Institutions at UCLA and by
 the Center for the Study of Futures Markets at Colum-
 bia.
 'The proportion produced in Florida is now close to
 100 percent. Indeed, the annual publication, Agricultur-
 al Statistics, by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, no
 longer gives a breakdown by area, reporting the produc-
 tion only for Florida (presumably because production
 elsewhere is so small). The last breakdown by area was
 for 1961 (see Agricultural Statistics, 1972, Table 324). In
 1961, Florida produced 115,866,000 gallons while Cali-
 fornia and Arizona combined produced 2,369,000 gal-
 lons. It may surprise the reader to know that OJ produc-
 tion for frozen concentrate is mainly a Florida industry;
 many table oranges do come from California. This
 difference between Florida and California oranges is
 attributable to differences in their sugar and juice con-
 tent and in their exteriors. Florida oranges are sweeter
 and make better-tasting juice. California oranges, being
 less sweet, have a longer shelf life and they also tend to
 have less juice but more appealing skins. Apparently,
 there is not as much substitutability as might have been
 imagined. Actually, Florida produces the bulk of all
 oranges for both table and juice. In 1972-73, for exam-
 ple, Florida orange production by weight was about 80
 percent of the U.S. total. (See Florida Agricultural Sta-
 tistics, Table 3, p. 4.)
 2See Tables 380 and 382 of Agricultural Statistics
 (1979, pp. 252 and 254).
 3A rough indication of exogenous shifts in demand
 due to income and tastes can be obtained from U.S.
 consumption of all citrus fruit which has hovered closely
 around 27 pounds per capita for a number of years (see
 Table 384, p. 255, Agricultural Statistics, 1979).
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 to mature.4 Thus, any vagaries in farmers'
 planting decisions are felt much later and do
 not impact the current year's crop. There
 might, however, be short-term effects from
 farming decisions concerning fertilizer use or
 harvesting methods. These could be in-
 fluenced by the prices of fertilizer and en-
 ergy.
 It should be emphasized that even un-
 stable conditions of demand and supply
 would not eliminate the influence of weather,
 they would simply make that influence harder
 to measure empirically. The main argument
 in favor of studying orange juice instead
 of other commodities is the geographical
 concentration of OJ production. The fact
 that nonweather influences seem unlikely to
 generate much empirical noise is simply an
 added benefit.
 I. Data
 A. Orange Juice Futures
 Futures contracts in frozen concentrated
 orange juice are traded by the Citrus Associ-
 ates of the New York Cotton Exchange.
 There are usually nine contracts outstanding
 with deliveries (expirations) scheduled every
 second month, January, March, etc., the most
 distant delivery being 17 to 18 months from
 the present. A contract is for 15,000 pounds
 of orange solids standardized by concentra-
 tion (termed "degrees Brix") and with
 minimum "scores" for color, flavor, and de-
 fects.5
 Price data6 are available for each day since
 the exchange began OJ trading in the early
 1970's. However, the weather data are avail-
 able only for October 1975 through Decem-
 ber 1981, so this constitutes the sample
 period. There were 1,564 trading days during
 this period.
 As is typical of many commodities, trad-
 ing volume in OJ futures tends to be con-
 centrated in the near-maturity contracts. The
 open interest of distant contracts, say 8 to 18
 months maturity, is often only 10 percent or
 less of the open interest in nearer contracts,
 say from 2 to 6 months maturity. Because of
 well-known problems in price data from thin
 markets,7 the fourth and longer maturities
 were discarded in the following empirical
 work.
 The nearest-maturity contract was also
 discarded after a close examination of its
 price behavior around the maturity date.
 Volume of trading is quite high in the nearest
 contract until just a few days before expira-
 tion. But in the last several days of the
 contract's life, open interest declines and
 price volatility increases substantially. A good
 example of the ensuing econometric problem
 involved the contract which matured on
 November 16, 1977. During the last fifteen
 minutes before expiration, its price rose from
 $1.30 to $2.20 per pound, an annualized rate
 of return of about 1.8 million percent. Such
 events would seem to have little to do with
 the weather.
 This leaves us with two contracts having,
 respectively, between 2 and 4 .ionths and
 between 4 and 6 months to maturity; an
 equally weighted average of the daily returns
 on these two contracts was chosen as the
 basic OJ return for use in all subsequent
 analysis. (Using either contract separately
 gives virtually identical results. This is to be
 expected because the correlation between
 their returns is .97.)
 On a contract expiration day, the shorter
 of these two contracts is dropped and a
 new contract, previously the fourth-from-
 4See John McPhee (1967) for a fascinating and enter-
 taining description of orange tree propagation and of
 the citrus business in general.
 5The contract quality is specified as follows: "U.S.
 Grade A with a Brix value of not less than 510 having a
 Brix value to acid ratio of not less than 13 to 1 nor more
 than 19.0 to 1 and a minimum score of 94, with the
 factor of color and flavor each scoring 37 points or
 higher, and defects at 19 or better..., provided that [OJ]
 with a Brix value of more than 660 shall be calculated as
 having 7.278 pounds of solids per gallon" (Citrus Fu-
 tures, undated). "Degrees Brix" is a term used in honor
 of a nineteenth-century German scientist, Adolf F. W.
 Brix (McPhee, p. 129).
 6The price used here is the "settlement" price. This
 price (which may or may not reflect an actual transac-
 tion) is determined by members of the exchange at the
 close of each day's trading. It is the price reported in the
 financial press.
 7See Myron Scholes and Joseph Williams (1977),
 Elroy Dimson (1979), Marshall Blume and Robert
 Stambaugh (1983).
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 TABLE 1-OJ FUTURES DAILY RETURNS BY DAY OF WEEK AND BY SEASON
 OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Day of Mean Returnsa
 Week Winterb Spring Summer Autumn All Seasons
 MondayC - .256 -.321 -.107 .0309 -.158
 (2.58) (1.84) (1.52) (1.84) (1.96)
 Tuesday .224 .269 .199 - .107 .146
 (2.11) (1.37) (.147) (1.48) (1.62)
 Wednesday .301 .188 - .102 - .169 .0540
 (1.72) (1.54) (1.40) (1.36) (1.52)
 Thursday .167 - .219 .113 .153 .0518
 (2.14) (1.16) (1.21) (1.35) (1.51)
 Friday .290 .0227 -.125 .242 .108
 (1.98) (1.55) (1.63) (1.53) (1.68)
 Post-Holiday - .0554 .311 .278 - .0817 .0102
 (1.78) (1.72) (1.25) (1.37) (1.52)
 All Days .141 -.00741 -.00079 .0253 .0392
 (2.09) (1.51) (1.51) (1.52) (1.66)
 Notes: Levene's test (see Morton Brown and Alan Forsythe, 1974) for equal variances:
 F = 3.59; tail probability 0. Dummy variable regression:
 R,= .0886 - .247 dm - .0784 dh R2 =.00211
 (1.86) (-2.30) (.328)
 where dm is 1 on Monday, 0 otherwise, and dh is 1 on post-holiday day, zero otherwise.
 aAverage of the second- and third-nearest maturity contracts' returns. The mean
 returns (standard deviations) of the two contracts separately were .0388(1.70) and
 .0397(1.65), respectively; their correlation was .969. The returns are shown in percent;
 standard deviations are shown below in parentheses.
 bWinter is defined as December, January, February, inclusive. Spring, Summer, and
 Autumn include, respectively, each subsequent three months.
 cMonday returns are from settlement price Friday to settlement price Monday.
 Other days are from settlement on previous day. Post-Holiday returns are from
 settlement on day before holiday to close on day after holiday.
 the-shortest maturity, starts to be used in
 construction of the return series. The return
 on the new contract over the expiration date
 replaces the return on what has become the
 shortest maturity contract.8
 Table 1 gives information about OJ re-
 turns over the sample period. The grand
 mean return is .0392 percent per day, about
 10.3 percent per annum. The rather large
 volatility of these returns is shown by the
 fact that the standard error of the mean daily
 return is 1.66/(1563)1/2 =.0420. The stan-
 dard error is larger than the mean despite the
 large sample size.
 In the body of the table, means and stan-
 dard deviations are broken down by season
 and by day of the week. The seasonal pattern
 shows a larger mean and larger variability
 during winter. This might have been antic-
 ipated on the grounds that colder tempera-
 tures and the risk of freezing make invest-
 ments in orange juice more hazardous during
 the winter months. A finer breakdown indi-
 cates, however, that the larger winter mean
 OJ return is due to January alone, perhaps
 for the same reason that equities of small
 8Specifically, let RTt be the continuously com-
 pounded return on day t of a contract which,matures on
 calendar date T. Say that contracts mature on days
 T= 60, 120, 180, 240, 360. The return series (R*) used
 here is calculated as follows
 R* = (R20 + R801t)/2 t < 60
 RF = (R80,t +R24)/2 120 > t > 60
 R* = (R240, t R360, t )/2 180 > t > 120,
 and similarly as times goes on and contracts mature.
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 firms have larger January returns.9 (Compare
 Donald Keim, 1983.)
 The day-of-the-week results can be com-
 pared to recent work on equity returns (Ken-
 neth French, 1980; Michael Gibbons and
 Patrick Hess, 1981) which found a signifi-
 cantly negative Monday effect. A similar pat-
 tern is observed here in the means.10 Thus,
 insofar as mean returns are concerned, OJ
 futures seem to display annual and weekly
 seasonals similar to equities.
 The intraweek pattern of standard devia-
 tions is interesting for what it does not dis-
 play. Since Monday's return covers a three-
 day period, while other days of the week
 cover only 24 hours, one might have thought
 that Monday's variance of returns would be
 approximately three times as large as the
 other days. Yet the ratio of Monday's to the
 average of the other days' variances is only
 about (1.96/1.58)2 =1.54. Monday's return
 has too low a variance. (Note that post-holi-
 day returns, which are always for at least two
 calendar days, also have too low a variance.)
 Because of this pattern of variances across
 days, it must be admitted that weather may
 not be the only relevant factor for OJ returns
 after all. If weather alone were moving OJ
 prices, Monday's return volatility should be
 larger because weather surprises must occur
 just as readily on a weekend as on any other
 day. Nevertheless, since no one has yet dis-
 covered just what factors are causing day-of-
 the-week patterns, I shall proceed with an
 examination of weather, which is at least a
 known factor.
 The OJ futures exchange imposes limits on
 price movements. These limit rules (see Ta-
 ble 2) prevent the price from moving by
 TABLE 2-LIMIT RULES OF THE CITRUS ASSOCIATES OF
 THE NEW YORK COTTON EXCHANGE
 AFTER (BEFORE) JANUARY 1, 1979
 General Rule: Prices may move no more than 5 (3) cents
 per pound, $750 ($450) per contract, above or
 below the settlement price of the previous market
 session.
 Increased Limit Rule: When three or more contract
 months have closed at the limit in the same
 direction for three successive business days, the
 limit is raised to 8 (5) cents per pound for those
 contract months. The limit remains at 8 (5) cents
 until fewer than three contract months close at the
 limit in the same direction, then the limit reverts to
 5 (3) cents on the next business day.
 Current Rule for Near Contract: On the last three days
 before the near contract's expiration, its limit is 10
 cents per pound. If that limit is reached during the
 market session, trading is suspended on all con-
 tracts for fifteen minutes. Then another 10 cents is
 added to or deducted from the near contract's limit
 and trading recommences. Limit moves and fifteen-
 minute suspensions can be repeated until the
 market's close. If this happens on the last day
 before expiration, trading hours are extended.
 more than a certain amount from the previ-
 ous day's settlement price. When a signifi-
 cant event, such as a freeze in Florida, causes
 the price to move the limit, the settlement
 price on that day cannot fully reflect all
 available information. In other words, limit
 rules cause a type of market information
 inefficiency (but not a profit opportunity).
 This might be inconsequential if limit moves
 occurred rarely; unfortunately, they are
 rather common. During the October 1975-
 December 1981 period, one or both of the
 two contracts being used here moved the
 price limit on 160 different trading days,
 slightly over 10 percent of the trading days
 in the sample. This implies that about 10
 percent of the recorded prices in the sample
 are known in advance not to reflect all rele-
 vant available information.
 Limit rules might be suspected as the rea-
 son why Monday's variance is too low since
 these rules would be more frequently applied
 to limit the three-day weekend/Monday re-
 turn. It turns out, however, that only 40 of
 the 160 limit moves in the sample occurred
 on Monday. This frequency is slightly higher
 than the frequency of 20 percent which would
 be expected if all five weekday returns
 9January's average daily OJ return was .701 percent
 (standard error =.238) while all othe.r months combi ed
 had an average daily return of - .0193 percent (standard
 error = .0402).
 ' When compared against other days of the week in
 an analysis of variance, Monday's return is found to be
 significantly lower (F-statistic of 5.20 and tail probabil-
 ity of .0228). Monday's mean return is, however, only
 marginally significantly negative; the standard error of
 the mean (of -.158) is .114 percent. The dummy vari-
 able regression reported at the bottom of the table
 shows that the Monday effect is significant but that the
 explained variance is low.
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 FIGURE 1. TIMING SCHEMATIC OF OJ FUTURES MARKET, WEATHER FORECASTS,
 AND ACTUAL PERIOD OF WEATHER AT ORLANDO
 Note: - indicates market trading hours
 covered the same number of hours. The ratio
 of Monday's return variance to the average
 variance on the other days is only 1.75 even
 when all limit move observations are ex-
 cluded.
 B. Central Florida Weather
 The U.S. Weather Service reporting sta-
 tion in Orlando issues a variety of different
 weather bulletins. The most relevant infor-
 mation for oranges involve temperature and
 rainfall; the data1l used here consist of daily
 information on these two variables.
 Each 24-hour interval is divided into 12-
 hour daytime and evening periods. The
 daytime period begins at 7:00 A.M., eastern
 standard time, and ends at 7:00 P.M. on the
 same day. The evening period begins at 7:00
 P.M. and ends at 7:00 A.M. the following day.
 For the daytime period, the weather service
 reports actual rainfall and the maximum
 temperature, while for the evening period,
 the rainfall and minimum temperature are
 reported.
 Three different forecasts of both rainfall
 and temperature are also provided. They cor-
 respond to periods 36 hours, 24 hours, and
 12 hours in advance of the 12-hour period to
 which the forecast applies. For example, say
 that the forecast is of the maximum tempera-
 ture on January 5 (which could occur any-
 time from 7:00 A.M. until 7:00 P.M.). The first
 forecast is issued about 5:00 A.M. on January
 4. (I call this the 36-hour-ahead forecast be-
 cause it is developed and issued during the
 third 12-hour period prior to the 12-hour
 observation period of the actual maximum
 temperature.) A second forecast applying to
 the maximum January 5 temperature is is-
 sued at 5:00 P.M. on January 4; then, the
 third forecast is issued at 5:00 A.M. on
 January 5. This same cycle, but delayed by
 12 hours, is used to issue forecasts of the
 minimum temperature on January 5 (from
 7:00 P.M. January 5 until 7:00 A.M. January
 6). Rainfall forecasts for the daytime and
 evening periods are issued along with the
 temperature forecasts.
 Figure 1 gives a timing schematic of the
 actual weather, the forecasts of weather, and
 the trading times of orange juice futures. The
 symbol po indicates the OJ settlement price
 on a particular calendar date. Note that po
 is observed during the 12-hour daytime
 period, well before the evening period be-
 gins, and even before the last forecast of
 evening weather issued by the weather
 service. For this reason, we might anticipate
 that surprises in daytime weather would be
 " The cooperation of Paul Polger of the National
 Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, who
 provided these data and provided a detailed explana-
 tion, is gratefully acknowledged.
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 associated with price movements of p-1 to
 po while evening weather surprises would
 influence price changes Po to p + ?
 The actual daily temperatures are plotted
 for the sample period in Figure 2 (+ in-
 dicates daily maximum and El indicates
 minimum). The figure shows that tempera-
 tures in central Florida are not only lower
 during the winter season, they are also more
 variable. Damage to orange trees occurs if
 the temperature drops below freezing and
 stays there for a period of several hours.
 Thus, the minimum (P.M.) temperature dur-
 ing the winter months would seem to be an
 important factor influencing the size of the
 crop and the price of futures.
 Table 3 shows that the Weather Service's
 short-term forecasts of temperature are quite
 accurate on average and that the forecast
 improves as its period approaches.12 The OJ
 futures market has access to both the 36-
 hour-ahead and the 24-hour-ahead forecast
 of that day's P.M. minimum temperature
 (compare Figure 1). These two forecasts are
 issued prior to the market's opening. Thus,
 even aside from whatever private weather
 forecasts are made by OJ futures traders, two
 reasonably accurate forecasts of the day's
 12However, there is a curiosity in these forecasts.
 Note that the A.M. level regressions tend to have slopes
 (b) below 1.0. This could be due to errors in the data
 (rather than in the forecasts). The data were filtered and
 obvious transcription errors were corrected as detected.
 Of course, there may still be errors remaining. Errors-
 in-variables-induced attenuation bias cannot, however,
 explain why the P.M. forecast intercept is significantly
 negative. The Theil inequality proportions indicate sig-
 nificant bias in the P.M. forecasts. Note that the low
 Durbin-Watson statistics on the 36-hour-ahead forecasts
 are to be expected since there is an intervening actual
 between this forecast and the actual to which the fore-
 cast applies. (See Figure 1.) In other words, the 36-
 hour-ahead forecast on day t is issued before the fore-
 cast error is known for the 36-hour-ahead forecast from
 day t - 1. This induces positive dependence in adjacent
 forecast errors.
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 TABLE 3-TEMPERATURE FORECAST ACCURACY FOR ORLANDO
 OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Temperature Level Temperature Change Hours
 Forecast a b R2 um a b R2 um
 is Aheada (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Maximum (A.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 4.23 .953 .872 1.15 .357 .832 .604 .777
 (2,040) (6.34) (118.) (1.53) (1.60, (3.34) (55.7) (1.81) (5.82,
 97.3) 93.4)
 24 4.60 .951 .896 3.24 .667 .912 .663 2.57
 (2,049) (7.79) (133.) (1.81) (2.16, (6.73) (63.4) (1.97) (1.75,
 94.6) 95.7)
 12 4.32 .952 .911 1.90 .511 .984 .708 1.55
 (2,048) (7.96) (145.) (1.91) (2.46, (5.56) (70.3) (1.90) (.061,
 95.6) 98.4)
 Minimum (P.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 -1.48 1.01 .884 6.14 -1.62 .771 .495 6.28
 (2,048) (-2.93) (125.) (1.42) (.035, (-9.24) (44.8) (1.64) (7.49,
 93.8) 86.2)
 24 -2.71 1.03 .907 8.88 -1.89 .823 .575 8.86
 (2,038) (-5.92) (141.) (1.58) (.532, (-11.7) (52.5) (1.64) (5.35,
 90.6) 85.8)
 12 - .852 1.00 .922 6.23 - 1.49 .902 .648 5.92
 (2,048) (-2.11) (155.) (1.76) (0.0, (-10.2) (61.3) (1.82) (2.01,
 93.8) 92.1)
 Notes: Regression: Actual = a + b (forecast). The "actual" is the minimum or maximum temperature observed during
 a 12-hour period. In the "changes" regression, the dependent variable is the actual percentage change from the
 previous day's corresponding 12-hour period and the explanatory variable is the predicted percentage change.
 Cols. (1),(2): t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
 Cols. (3): Durbin-Watson statistics are shown in parentheses.
 Cols. (4): Ur, Ud are shown in parentheses. The inequality proportions are shown in percent. See Henri Theil (1966,
 pp. 32-34). Um = bias, Ur= regression, Ud = disturbance, proportions of mean squared prediction error due to,
 respectively, bias, deviation of regression slope from 1.0, and residuals.
 aSample size is shown in parentheses. There were 2,284 calendar days in the sample. However, the data contain
 numerous missing observations.
 crucial minimum temperature are publicly
 available during trading hours.
 Rainfall is also predicted by the Weather
 Service, but the form of the forecast is less
 useful for our purposes than in the case of
 temperature. The forecast "probability" of
 rain is always an even decile such as 30
 percent and it rarely exceeds 60 percent.
 Weather service officials have told me that
 this forecast is intended to convey the chance
 of any measurable precipitation.
 Table 4 reports the complete sample distri-
 bution of rainfall forecasts and actuals (the
 latter are provided in categories only). As
 shown, high forecast probabilities of rain are
 unusual even though there is measurable
 rainfall during about 28 percent of the re-
 porting periods. The last column shows that
 the actual frequency of the rain is not far
 from the forecast probability. There is not
 a strong connection between the forecast
 probability and the amount of rain, but the
 Weather Service forecast is not intended to
 predict the amount, simply the chance of
 rain in any amount.
 As shall be shown in the next section,
 there is an obvious relation between temper-
 ature and the price of OJ futures. The re-
 lation between rainfall and price is much
 more difficult to detect, if it is there at all.
 Perhaps this is due to temperature being a
 more important variable for the crop. Per-
 haps it is due to less useful weather data
 regarding rainfall.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.159 on Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:56:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 868 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1984
 TABLE 4-FoRECAST PROBABILITY OF RAIN VS. ACTUAL RAINFALL BY CATEGORY IN ORLANDO
 OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Actual Rainfall (inches)
 Forecast .001- .01- .121- .251- .501- 1.01- 2.01- 3.01- Frequency of
 Probability 0 .009 .120 .25 .50 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Total Measurable
 of Raina Frequency (All Forecasts) Precipitationa
 0 3157 79 28 12 3 1 1 0 0 3281 3.78
 10 2439 216 100 39 29 14 9 1 0 2847 16.7
 20 1401 266 153 51 34 17 11 2 0 1935 27.6
 30 904 260 180 83 39 34 17 2 0 1519 40.5
 40 420 178 156 68 58 56 35 7 1 979 57.1
 50 279 133 177 80 72 59 40 6 5 851 67.2
 60 116 70 120 63 48 37 30 0 3 487 76.2
 70 18 22 29 22 16 23 7 1 0 138 87.0
 80 8 4 6 2 5 12 3 1 0 41 80.5
 90 1 1 7 3 0 5 1 0 0 18 94.4
 100 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 100.
 Total 8743 1229 957 423 304 259 155 20 9 12099
 Note: X2 Test of Dependence:
 Tail Tail
 x2 Probability Forecasts x2 Probability
 All Forecasts 4151 p = 0.0 36-Hours-Ahead 1185 p = 0.0
 All A.M. Forecasts 2277 p = 0.0 24-Hours-Ahead 1421 p = 0.0
 All P.M. Forecasts 1559 p = 0.0 12-Hours-Ahead 1744 p = 0.0
 aShown in percent.
 II. Empirical Results
 A. Temperature
 Cold weather is bad for orange produc-
 tion. Orange trees cannot withstand freezing
 temperatures that last for more than a few
 hours. Florida occasionally has freezing
 weather and the history of citrus production
 in the state has been marked by famous
 freezes. In 1895, almost every orange tree in
 Florida was killed to the ground on February
 8, production declined by 97 percent, and 16
 years passed before it recovered to its previ-
 ous level."3 Farmers have since learned how
 to counter freezes with hardier trees, smudge
 pots, water spraying,'4 and air circulation by
 large fans; but although the trees are now
 more likely to survive a freeze, the crop can
 be severely damaged. Even a mild freeze will
 prompt the trees to drop significant amounts
 of fruit.
 Figure 3 illustrates the impact of freezing
 weather on OJ futures prices during the sam-
 ple period. The actual minimum temperature
 at Orlando is plotted along with the OJ price
 level.'5 Freezing level is indicated by the
 horizontal dashed line.
 During this 64-year period, there were 27
 recorded freezing temperatures (below 320)
 at Orlando out of 2284 calendar days. How-
 ever, only four periods registered tempera-
 tures below 300. These occurred on January
 17-21, 1977, January 2, 1979, March 2, 1980,
 January 11-13 and 18, 1981. (See Figure 2
 also.) Figure 3 shows that these episodes
 were accompanied by significant price in-
 creases. The January freezes in 1977 and
 1981 were particularly harsh in that six
 successive days and three successive nights,
 13McPhee (p. 101).
 14 Spraying trees with water during a freeze can pro-
 tect them under certain conditions. The water, freezing
 on the trees' leaves and buds, gives off heat in the
 process of changing from a liquid to a solid.
 15Thirty cents has been added to the OJ price in
 order to keep the plots apart. The price is an average of
 the second and third shortest-maturity contracts. (See
 Section I.)
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 respectively, had freezing temperatures. The
 most severe freeze during this sample, and
 the largest accompanying price increase, oc-
 curred during the latter period, on January
 11, 12, and 13, 1981, when successive daily
 minimum temperatures were 240, 230, and
 200. During the week of January 12-16, OJ
 futures prices were up the limit on all five
 trading days.
 Market participants realize, of course, that
 severe freezes are more likely during winter,
 so the price of OJ futures in the autumn
 should be high enough to reflect the proba-
 bility of a freeze during the coming season.
 Each day thereafter that passes without a
 freeze should be accompanied by a slight
 price decline, a relief that winter is one day
 closer to being over. Also, harvesting of
 oranges begins in the fall and lasts until early
 summer, and inventories typically increase
 over the winter months.
 For both of these reasons: freezes that do
 not occur and inventory build-up; there is a
 downtrend in futures prices during a typical
 nonfreeze winter. This pattern can be seen in
 every year of the sample (Figure 3), except
 1977. A general downward movement with
 small fluctuations is interrupted by occa-
 sional sharp price increases sufficient to bring
 positive returns, on average, to those with
 long positions.'6 The distribution of returns
 is very skewed to the right.
 If the OJ futures market is an efficient in-
 formation processor, it should incorporate
 all publicly available long-term and short-
 term weather forecasts. Any private forecasts
 should be incorporated to the extent that
 traders who are aware of those forecasts are
 also in command of significant resources.
 The futures price should, therefore, incorpo-
 rate the predictable part of weather in ad-
 vance. Unpredicted weather alone should be
 '6An extensive theoretical discussion of this phenom-
 enon is given by Benoit Mandelbrot (1966).
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 TABLE 5-OJ FUTURES RETURNS AND TEMPERATURE FORECAST ERRORS
 WITH AND WITHOUT WEIGHTING, OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Hours
 Forecast Return Lead/Lag (Days)
 Seasons is Aheada b-2 b_l bo b+1 b+2
 Maximum (A.M.) Temperature Forecast
 Unweighted 36 .105 -.00414 -.0463 -.00397 -.322
 (1,391) (1.31) (-.0507) (-.567) (-.0487) (- 3.91)
 Weighted .102 - .0558 - .0894 - .0600 - .490
 (1.15) (-.624) (- 1.00) (- .673) (- 5.37)
 Unweighted 24 .0639 - .0497 - .0113 .0379 - .247
 (1,408) (.872) (-.673) (-.154) (.510) (-3.36)
 Weighted .0374 - .0615 .0224 .0585 - .379
 (.461) (- .750) (.275) (.714) (-4.71)
 Unweighted 12 .000123 - .0715 - .000467 .0565 - .123
 (1,400) (.00186) (-1.07) (-.00699) (.838) (-1.84)
 Weighted - .0851 - .0905 .00691 .0295 - .191
 (-1.17) (-1.23) (.0936) (.398) (-2.62)
 Minimum (P.M.) Temperature Forecast
 Unweighted 36 .0822 -.104 -.154 .136 .0570
 (1,407) (.632) (- .791) (-1.17) (1.03) .436
 Weighted .101 - .198 - .379 .133 .0561
 (.664) (-1.30) (- 2.49) (.874) (.374)
 Unweighted 24 .0412 - .139 - .352 - .238 - .0404
 (1,399) (.357) (-1.20) (- 3.03) (- 2.03) (- .348)
 Weighted .0593 - .220 - .673 - .544 - .139
 (.442) (-1.62) (-4.96) (- 3.99) (-1.09)
 Unweighted 12 - .0698 - .152 - .263 - .0849 .104
 (1,398) (- .677) (-1.47) (- 2.52) (- .807) (.991)
 Weighted - .0796 - .231 - .549 - .217 .133
 (-.678) (-1.97) (- 4.62) (-1.83) (1.13)
 Notes: The regression equation is log(A/F), = a + b-2R,_2 + b_1R,_1 + b0R, + b1R,+l + b2R,+2, where A is
 actual temperature, F is forecast temperature and R, is the return on day t of an equally weighted sum of two futures
 contracts.
 T-statistics are shown in parentheses. All Durbin-Watson statistics were in the range 1.6-1.9. Adjusted R2s were
 between 1 and 3 percent.
 The weighting scheme is January = 7, February = 6, March = 5, April = 4, May = 3, June = 2, July = 1, August = 2,
 September = 3, October = 4, November = 5, December = 6.
 aSample size is shown in parentheses.
 contemporaneously correlated with price
 movements.
 To examine the market's information
 processing ability, a series of empirical tests
 were carried out relating surprises in temper-
 ature to OJ futures price changes. The tem-
 perature forecast error, the percentage dif-
 ference between the actual temperature and
 the forecast temperature provided by the Na-
 tional Weather Service, was taken as a mea-
 sure of surprise. Price change was measured
 by the average of the daily returns on the
 second- and the third-shortest maturity con-
 tracts (see Section I).
 Table 5 presents the first results. The re-
 gressions there use the temperature forecast
 error as the dependent variable. The inde-
 pendent variables are the same day's OJ
 return plus the returns on two leading and
 two lagged days. (There is no causality im-
 plied or intended by choosing the "depen-
 dent" and "independent" variables in this
 way. Causality actually runs from weather to
 prices.) Results are given separately in Table
 5 for the daily maximum and minimum tem-
 peratures, for each of the three available
 forecasts, and for observations weighted and
 unweighted by season.
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 TABLE 6-OJ FUTURES RETURNS AND TEMPERATURE FORECAST ERRORS WITH AGGREGATION OF LIMIT MOVES,
 OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981, OBSERVATIONS WEIGHTED BY SEASON
 Hours Return Lag/Lead (Days)
 Forecast
 is Ahead b--2 b_l bo b+1 b+2
 Maximum (A.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 .0692 .0671 - .102 .0449 - .0341
 (1,257) (1.46) (1.25) (- 2.31) (1.01) (- .686)
 24 .0654 - .00721 - .111 .0234 - .0545
 (1,272) (1.48) (-.165) (- 2.74) (.570) (- 1.33)
 12 .0518 .0196 - .0121 .0482 - .0368
 (1,263) (1.30) (.495) (-.327) (1.30) (-.987)
 Minimum (P.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 .0542 - .101 - .236 .167 .0291
 (1,272) (.652) (-1.23) (-- 3.08) (2.16) (.377)
 24 - .0955 - .00879 - .622 - .0395 - .00346
 (1,263) (-1.32) (-.122) (- 9.25) (-.584) (- .0510)
 12 - .00910 .0641 - .143 .0226 .106
 (1,262) (- .138) (.981) (- 2.37) (.375) (1.74)
 Notes: For regression and weights, see Table 5. All Durbin-Watson statistics were in the range 1.50-1.95. Adjusted
 R2s were between 1 and 4 percent.
 Given the preceding discussion, it might
 seem that the only relevant temperature ob-
 servations would be for winter evenings (since
 freezes do not occur at other times); but the
 futures market deals in anticipations, so fore-
 cast errors during the morning hours or even
 errors during the summer months could
 conceivably contain meaningful information
 about the probability of a freeze later. The
 unweighted regressions with A.M. tempera-
 ture errors do indeed contain some statisti-
 cal significance. But the P.M. regressions
 weighted'7 by season are more significant. In
 the P.M. weighted cases, the contempora-
 neous OJ return is always statistically signifi-
 cant with the anticipated negative sign.
 The P.M. temperature results indicate that
 the OJ futures price on a given day at the
 close of trading (2:45 P.M.) is a statistically
 significant predictor of the forecast error of
 the minimum temperature later that evening
 (from 7:00 P.M. until 7:00 A.M. the following
 morning). The price appears to be a slightly
 better predictor of the error in the forecast
 issued by the National Weather Service at
 5:00 A.M. that same morning than of the
 errors made by the two other forecasts (5:00
 P.M. the previous evening and 5:00 P.M. later
 the same day).
 The futures price is not informationally
 efficient, however, because several later re-
 turns are statistically significant in some re-
 gressions. The significant negative coefficient
 b + in the P.M. 24-hour ahead case might be
 consistent with efficiency since trading ceases
 on day zero before the evening period begins
 and recommences on day + 1 after the eve-
 ning period ends (see Figure 1). However,
 the significant two-day later negative coeffi-
 cients (b ?2) for the A.M. temperatures cannot
 be so easily dismissed.
 There is ample a priori reason to suspect
 some effective informational inefficiency in-
 duced by limit move rules. There were 160
 limit moves during the sample and prices on
 these days cannot reflect all information (see
 Section I). In a first attempt to eliminate this
 source of inefficiency, limit moves were "ag-
 gregated." The results are given in Table 6.
 For data used in this table, if a particular
 day registered a limit price move, the "eco-
 17The weighting scheme is rather arbitrary but is was
 the only one I tried. January observations, in the middle
 of winter, receive the highest weight; July observations,
 in the middle of summer, receive the lowest. January
 observations are weighted seven times more heavily than
 July observations, intervening months are weighted lin-
 early between January and July; i.e., February = 6,
 March = 5, . . . June = 2, . . . December = 6.
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 nomic" closing price for that day was as-
 sumed to be the price on the next subsequent
 day which did not have a limit move.
 On Tuesday, January 6, 1976, for example,
 the March contract closed at 59.75 cents per
 pound. The next day registered a limit move
 of 3 cents; the reported closing price was
 62.75 cents. On Thursday (January 8), which
 was not a limit move day, the settlement
 price was 64.4 cents. This was taken as an
 estimate of what the price would have been
 the preceding day (January 7) if the ex-
 change had imposed no limits. Thus, the
 daily return for January 7 used in the regres-
 sion was log,(64.4/59.75) = 7.5 percent.
 There was no observation used for Jan-
 uary 8.
 Limit moves often occur one after another.
 In such cases, the price on the first day with
 no limit move was brought back to the day
 of the first limit move and all intervening
 days were discarded.'8
 This procedure obviously overestimates the
 ability of the market to predict temperatures.
 Hindsight was used in that no one could
 know for sure on the first limit move day
 how many additional days with limit moves
 would follow. Thus, the results in Table 6 are
 biased in favor of finding market efficiency,
 as opposed to those in Table 5 that are
 biased against finding efficiency because of
 the exchange's own rules.
 In Table 6, there is no longer a significant
 negative relation of temperature forecast er-
 ror and later OJ returns. This indicates that
 the statistical significance of the lagging
 coefficients found in Table 5 was indeed due
 to the exchange's limit rules and not to some
 other possible source of informational in-
 efficiency.'9 Notice that five of the six con-
 temporaneous coefficients are significant and
 20 negative.
 To estimate the predictive content of OJ
 prices without resorting to hindsight, while
 at the same time including the extra informa-
 tion known to market participants that par-
 ticular days had limit moves, the regressions
 in Table 7 were computed. A contempora-
 neous return and a lagged daily return were
 included as predictors along with slope dum-
 mies for limit move days.
 Slope dummies are more appropriate than
 intercept dummies because the size of a limit
 move changed during the sample period (see
 Table 2).21 Before January 1, 1979, the limit
 was 3 cents while it was 5 cents thereafter.
 As a consequence, only 39 out of 160 limit
 move days occurred during 1979-81 even
 though almost one-half of the sample ob-
 servations were in those years. Thus, during
 1979-81, the settlement price was more in-
 formationally efficient and the news that a
 particular day displayed a limit move con-
 stituted more material information. Slope
 dummies may not perfectly capture the
 greater importance of limit moves in the last
 three years of the sample, but at least they
 do weight these observations more heavily
 (by approximately 67 percent).
 The F-statistics for these regressions indi-
 cate that the A.M. forecast errors cannot be
 18If an up limit was followed by a down limit (or vice
 versa), day 1 was treated as if the return were zero and
 day 2 was discarded. The next included observation was
 then for day 3 (if it was not a limit move). In other
 words, for any sequence of limit moves followed im-
 mediately by another sequence in the opposite direc-
 tion, the first closing price after reversal was brought
 back to the first day of the initial sequence. Then the
 price on the first day with no limit move is brought back
 to the first day of the second sequence.
 19The one anomalous coefficient, b + in the 36-hour
 P.M. regression, has a positive sign. A single "significant"
 coefficient such as this is to be expected by chance
 among so many possibilities.
 20 The reader may notice that the number of observa-
 tions differs by only one, 1263 to 1262, between the P.M.
 24- and 12-hour regressions; yet the t-statistics on the
 contemporaneous returns are - 9.25 and - 2.37. Could
 this be caused by a single observation out of more than
 1200? The answer is no. There are actually 138 observa-
 tions that differed in these two regressions (due to
 missing data), but almost exactly one-half were missing
 from each regression. (There were other common mis-
 sing observations.)
 21Also, a slope dummy preserves the sign of the price
 change. This could be done, too, with intercept dum-
 mies, for example, using + 1, 0, and -1 for up limit,
 normal, and down limit, but the slope dummy accom-
 plishes this feat automatically while allowing for the
 nonstationarity in the size of a limit move.
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 TABLE 7-PREDICTIVE MODEL OF TEMPERATURE FORECAST ERRORS USING SLOPE DUMMY VARIABLES
 FOR LIMIT MOVE DAYS OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981, WEIGHTING BY SEASONS
 Hours Forecast Contemporaneous Lagged One Day
 isAhead bo do b d_ Fa
 Maximum (A.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 -.0636 -.0839 .0750 -.348 2.80
 (1,391) (-.495) (-.475) (.580) (-1.91)
 24 .0992 - .213 - .0989 .0422 .897
 (1,408) (.835) (-1.34) (- .845) (.254)
 12 .0198 -.0581 -.0807 -.0859 1.16
 (1,400) (.186) (-.386) (-.766) (-.576)
 Minimum (P.M.) Temperature Forecast
 36 -.672 -.418 .0282 -.276 2.71
 (1,407) (-.329) (-1.39) (.131) (- .898)
 24 .119 -1.55 .184 - .588 23.9
 (1,399) (.616) (- 5.82) (.961) (- 2.17)
 12 -.119 -.643 .217 -.781 14.7
 (1,398) (-.697) (- 2.78) (1.30) (- 3.32)
 Notes: The regression equation is log(A/F), = a + b0R, + do8,R, + b_1R_1 + d_183_1R,_, where A is actual
 temperature, F is forecast temperature, R, is return on day t, 8, =1 if there was a limit move on day t and zero
 otherwise.
 See weighting scheme in Table 5.
 T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Durbin-Watsons were in the range 1.59 to 1.99. Adjusted R2s were in the
 range .0018 to .038.
 aF-statistics for the regressors having no effect. The 95 percent fractile is approximately 5.6.
 predicted by the current and lagged OJ re-
 turns plus a limit move slope dummy. This is
 also true for the P.M. 36-hour ahead fore-
 casts. However, both the 24- and 12-hour
 ahead forecast errors can be improved by
 prior OJ returns.
 The lack of predictive content of A.M. tem-
 peratures is, perhaps, not all that surprising
 because A.M. temperatures are relevant only
 to the extent that they predict freezes that
 evening. Apparently, this link is too weak to
 be picked up with statistical reliability by OJ
 returns.
 The low predictive content for P.M. tem-
 peratures may be a disappointment until one
 reflects upon the scope of possible predictive
 ability. As shown in Table 3, about 90 per-
 cent of the variability in temperature is re-
 moved by the National Weather Service's
 forecast. The OJ prices predict a very small
 but still significant part of the remaining 10
 percent.22
 B. Rainfall
 Orange juice prices are replotted in Figure
 4 along with the day's total rainfall23 (in
 tenths of inches) at Orlando. Unlike the
 earlier plot of price and temperature (Figure
 3), no relation between the two series in
 Figure 4 is apparent to the naked eye.
 The effect of rainfall on the crop is much
 less obvious than the effect of temperature.
 Most of the groves in Florida are not
 irrigated, so a long dry spell might be damag-
 22It should be noted that all of the contemporaneous
 slope dummies (do) have negative signs. Also, the
 differences between the last two regressions in the table
 are intriguing but puzzling. The lagged slope dummy
 (d_1) is more important for the 12-hour forecast error
 than for the 24-hour forecast error. Could this be related
 to the fact that the 12-hour forecast is not issued until
 after the market closes, while the 24-hour forecast is
 issued before it opens?
 23Rainfall data are available only in the categories
 shown in Table 4. To construct Figure 4, the midpoint
 of each category was used as an estimate of the actual
 rainfall in inches. The A.M. and P.M. figures were added
 to obtain the total precipitation for the day.
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 FIGURE 4. 0J FUTURE~S PRICES AND DAILY RAINFALL AT ORLANDO
 ing. On the other hand, the crop could be
 reduced by extremely heavy rain or by wind
 damage from tropical storms (that appear in
 the rainfall time series because they also
 drop a lot of water).
 For example, on November 6, 1981, the
 Wall Street Journal reported higher orange
 juice prices "... on news of a hurricane off
 the Florida coast," and on February 18, 1983,
 prices were purportedly higher due to ". . . talk
 of heavy rain." Some confusion about the
 effect of rainfall is disclosed in the latter
 story; it included a statement from the
 Florida Citrus Commission that the orange
 crop was " unscathed" by the rain. " 'Our
 oranges are enjoying the wrather,' said a
 department spokesman, 'oranges need a lot
 of moisture.' " A commodities " analyst"
 stated that OJ traders drove up prices be-
 cause they were confused by reports of rain
 damage to strawberries and tomatoes!
 Whether or not the futures market under-
 stands the effect of rainfall is rather moot if
 the empiricist does not understand it well
 enough to develop a measure of rainfall
 surprise. With this admission in mind, let us
 plunge ahead into this turbid subject.
 As shown previously in Section II (Table
 4), National Weather Service rainfall fore-
 casts are statistically significant but imper-
 fect predictors of actual precipitation. I
 experimented with several different models
 of rainfall forecasts (including "probit" and
 logarithmic models), in order to find the
 most reliable predictor. It turned out that the
 largest reduction in variance was obtained
 with the simplest of regression models,
 A, a + bEt,
 where At=1, ... , 9 is the actual rainfall by
 category on day t and F, is the forecast
 "probability of rain." The adjusted R2 of
 this regression ranged between .118 and .332
 (see Table 8). It is interesting to note that
 predictive ability for rainfall rises more
 rapidly as the prediction period approaches
 than it does in the case of temperature (com-
 pare Table 3).
 Table 8 contains F-statistics from regres-
 sions relating the rainfall forecast error to
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 TABLE 8-PREDICTIVE MODEL OF RAINFALL FORECAST
 ERRORS USING SLOPE DuMMY VARIABLES FOR
 LIMIT MOVE DAYS OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981,
 No WEIGHTING
 Hours Adjusted R2 F-Statistic
 Forecast of Weather of OJ Return
 is Ahead Service Forecasta Predictive Power b.c
 A.M. Rainfall
 36 .239 .362
 (1,371)
 24 .265 .410
 (1,393)
 12 .332 .417
 (1,372)
 P.M. Rainfall
 36 .118 .388
 (1,393)
 24 .165 .230
 (1,374)
 12 .225 .629
 (1,384)
 aActual rainfall A, by category, (At = 1, 2, ... 9), was
 predicted by the Weather Service's "probability of rain,"
 Ft, in the simple regression model At = a + bFt + Et; the
 forecast error Et was then used as the dependent variable
 in another regression model with OJ returns as predic-
 tors (see fn. c below).
 b The 95 percent fractile of the F-statistic is ap-
 proximately 5.6.
 c The regression model was Et = a + bo Rt + do3t Rt +
 d? 18t - d 1 Rt_1R1 , where E, is the Weather
 Service's rainfall prediction error, R, is the OJ return on
 day t and St is + 1 if day t had a limit move, otherwise
 zero. No coefficient was significant and coefficients are
 not reported for reasons of space.
 the contemporaneous and lagged OJ return
 plus a slope dummy for limit moves, that is,
 the same purely predictive model as the one
 for temperature in Table 7. As might have
 been anticipated in light of the preceding
 discussion, OJ returns appear to have no
 significant predictive power for rainfall.24
 There was not a single significant coefficient
 out of the 24 possible and no F-statistic is
 significant in any of the six regressions.
 C. Nonweather Influences on OJ Prices
 The small predictive power for tempera-
 ture and rainfall seems to imply that in-
 fluences other than weather are affecting OJ
 returns. What might they be? In an attempt
 to find out, news stories in the financial press
 were systematically examined.
 From October 1, 1975 through December
 31, 1981 (the sample period of the paper), a
 total of 91 articles related to oranges ap-
 peared in the Wall Street Journal; 26 articles
 reported either results of weather (17) or
 forecasts of weather (9). Of the 26 weather
 articles, 25 concerned temperature and 1
 concerned rainfall. There were 22 articles
 disclosing crop forecasts by the U.S. Depart-
 ment of Agriculture, 15 articles reporting
 price movements with no explanation, 7
 articles about international conditions (Ca-
 nadian and Japanese imports and Brazilian
 exports), 6 articles about supermarket sup-
 plies, and 15 miscellaneous articles. In this
 last category, the subjects ranged from prod-
 uct quality (4) and new products (1) through
 antitrust action against the Sunkist coopera-
 tive in California (3), to such truly unclassi-
 fiable stories as orange rustlers in Florida
 and advertising contracts with Anita Bryant.
 The number and content of weather sto-
 ries shows that weather is considered im-
 portant and that rainfall is a relatively minor
 factor compared to temperature. Among the
 other topics, ex post stories about futures
 price movements per se and most of the
 miscellaneous stories could not possibly have
 been about true influences on earlier OJ price
 variation. Agricultural crop forecasts, though,
 would seem likely to have moved prices in
 some direction. Perhaps international news,
 reports of supermarket supplies, and anti-
 trust actions are also relevant. The variability
 of returns was computed for periods ending
 on the Wall Street Journal publication date
 of such articles and including two prior trad-
 ing days (to allow for news leakage). This
 variability is compared in Table 9 to the
 variability of returns on dates with no orange
 juice news.
 24A similar model was computed with a dependent
 variable defined as the absolute value of the rainfall
 forecast's prediction error. Of course, this would not be
 a legitimate model from an efficient markets perspective
 since it would not imply predictive ability of the direc-
 tion of error (even if it had worked). It is, however,
 suggested by the possibility that either too much or too
 little rain is bad for the orange crop. As it turned out,
 the model had even lower explained variance than the
 model in Table 8 which preserved the sign of the rainfall
 prediction error.
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 TABLE 9-VARIABILITY OF OJ FUTURES RETURNS ON DAYS WITH NEWS ABOUT
 ORANGE JUICE IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Supplies,
 Crop Antitrust,
 No News Weather Forecast International Miscellaneous
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Standard Deviation 1.53 2.86 2.01 1.97 1.37
 of Returns (1361) (64) (60) (34) (34)
 Tail
 Comparisons Among F-Statistic Probability
 Levene's Test Cols. (1)-(5) 22.5 0.0000
 for Equal Cols. (1), (3), (4), (5) 9.83 .0018
 Variancesa Cols. (2), (3), (4). 8.99 .0033
 Notes: Standard deviation of returns are shown in percent per day, with sample size
 shown in parentheses; returns on an equally weighted index of the second and third
 from the shortest maturity contracts on the day of the news story and on the two
 preceding trading days.
 Sample sizes are smaller than the number of possible days because of overlapping
 dates among articles. For overlapping dates, returns were assigned hierarchically to
 category (2) (Weather) first, then to categories (3), (4), and (5), respectively.
 aSee Brown and Forsythe.
 The miscellaneous category has a low
 volatility. It is even lower than the variability
 of returns on days with no news stories.
 Volatility of returns is highest during periods
 when stories about weather were published.
 During periods associated with stories about
 crop forecasts, retail supplies, antitrust ac-
 tions, and international events, volatility is
 higher than during "no news" periods. How-
 ever, it is significantly lower than during
 periods with weather-related news stories.
 From this evidence, weather remains as
 the most important identifiable factor in-
 fluencing OJ returns. Crop forecasts and
 other newsworthy events have an influence,
 but their frequency is too small and their
 impact too slight to explain a material part
 of the variability in returns left unexplained
 by weather. As Table 9 shows, there is sub-
 stantial volatility (a daily standard deviation
 of returns of 1.53 percent per day), on days
 that are not associated with any story about
 oranges in the Wall Street Journal; and these
 days constitute about 87 percent of the sam-
 ple observations.
 In addition to events important enough to
 appear in special orange juice stories in the
 financial press, other influences on supply
 and demand might be directly measurable.
 For instance, stock market returns could
 measure general economic activity and thus
 provide a proxy for consumer demand.
 Canada is the largest customer for U.S.
 orange juice, so the Canadian dollar/U.S.
 dollar exchange rate might have a measur-
 able impact on orange juice because it would
 proxy for Canadian demand. Energy prices
 could affect short-term supply because they
 influence the cost of operating farm equip-
 ment and the costs of processing and distrib-
 uting the product. Petroleum is also a direct
 ingredient of fertilizer and a major compo-
 nent of fertilizer production costs.
 Table 10 offers evidence about the in-
 fluence of these and other variables on OJ
 price movements. Two regressions were com-
 puted. The first involves the OJ return as
 dependent variable. It shows that cold tem-
 peratures indeed cause OJ price movements,
 but general stock market returns, changes in
 the Canadian dollar exchange rate, and oil
 stock returns (a measure of energy prices),
 have no significant influence.
 The second regression in Table 10 uses the
 squared OJ return as dependent variable.
 This was done because the objective here is
 merely to identify sources of price move-
 ments in either direction, as opposed to test-
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 TABLE 10- T-STATISTICS OF EXPLANATORY FACTORS
 FOR OJ RETURNS, No CONSIDERATION OF LIMIT MOVES,
 DAILY DATA, OCTOBER 1975-DECEMBER 1981
 Dependent Variable
 Squared
 Explanatory Variable OJ Return OJ Return
 Max (32 - T_ 1,O)a 5.40 7.99
 Max (32- T_0,0) 3.69 8.09
 (Oil Stock Return)-Ib -.618 .3859
 (Oil Stock Return)0 .624 2.119
 (VW Market Retum) .525 -1.059
 (VW Market Return)0 -.120 -1.539
 (A CDN exch. Rate) - d -.417 -.759g
 (A CDN exch. Rate)0 .577 .9389
 Mondaye -2.18 4.23
 Weather-Related News Storyf - 9.36
 Crop Forecast News Storyf - 3.35
 Supplies or Int'l News Storyf - -.563
 Miscellaneous News Storyf - -1.47
 Multiple Adjusted R2 .0668 .268
 F-Statistic for Regression 13.4 45.0
 Durbin-Watson 1.81 1.39
 Number of Observations 1,559 1,559
 aT, is the minimum temperature at Orlando on day t.
 b Return on an equally weighted portfolio of oil stocks
 listed on the NYSE and the AMEX, consisting of up to
 45 firms. The sample consisted of all listed oil firms
 covered in the 1982 Value Line service.
 cValue-weighted index of all NYSE and AMEX
 stocks.
 d Percentage change in the Canadian/U.S. dollar ex-
 change rate.
 'Dummy variable; 1 if Monday, 0 otherwise.
 f Dummy variable; 1 if news story in this category in
 the Wall Street Journal on day t or t ? 1, zero otherwise.
 9T-statistic for the squared explanatory variable.
 ing the direction of influence of particular
 variables. Using the squared return permits
 the inclusion of dummy variables on news
 story dates without having to decide whether
 the story should be associated with a positive
 or negative price change. To illustrate the
 problem, take the case of crop forecast sto-
 ries. It would be very hard to know whether
 a particular forecast by the Department of
 Agriculture is above or below the previously
 expected production level without looking at
 the OJ price movement itself.
 In this second regression, cold weather
 remains very significant and stories related to
 weather and to crop forecasts are significant
 as well (the latter result confirms the implica-
 tions drawn from Table 9). The contempora-
 neous squared oil stock return is also signifi-
 cant, though its t-statistic indicates a much
 lower level of influence. (This is something of
 a curiosity in that oil stock returns are unre-
 lated in direction to OJ returns in the first
 regression.) Finally, notice that only 27 per-
 cent of the variability in squared OJ returns
 is explained by all of these variables com-
 bined. Most of the variability remains unex-
 plained.25
 D. Supply Shocks vs. Demand Shocks
 Variability in OJ prices could be caused by
 shifts in demand induced by changes in the
 prices of substitute products. The prices of
 apple juice, tomato juice, and soft drinks,
 inter alia, should influence the demand for
 orange juice. We have seen already in Table
 10 that general consumer demand and the
 demand of the largest foreign customer
 (Canada) are not important relative to the
 supply shocks of weather, energy prices, and
 cr p forecasts. Table 11 provides informa-
 tion about the relative importance of more
 micro demand shocks.
 For firms in the orange juice business and
 for certain firms producing substitutes, daily
 stock returns were related, firm by firm, to
 OJ returns. In each case, the firm's return
 was regressed on the contemporaneous OJ
 return, plus two leading and two lagged OJ
 returns, plus slope dummies for limit move
 days on the OJ exchange. The F-statistics of
 the regression were examined for signifi-
 cance. In cases where significance was indi-
 cated, the coefficients were examined for
 direction of comovement between equity and
 OJ returns.
 Two basic types of firms were examined.
 The first type consists of firms whose SIC
 (standard industrial classification) code on
 the CRSP tape indicated that it was in some
 aspect of the orange juice or a related food-
 processing business. (It had the same SIC
 25 These regressions are obviously misspecified (for
 example, notice the Durbin-Watson statistics in the
 second regression). However, they are intended merely
 to characterize the data, not to test any particular the-
 ory, so it seems doubtful that much can be learned by
 using more sophisticated econometric methods.
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 TABLE 11 -RETURNS ON AGRICULTURE RELATED EQUITIES AND RETURNS ON ORANGE JUICE FUTURESa
 Relation to
 Companyb Line of Business OJ Returnsc
 American Agronomics Owns 9200 acres of Fl. citrus; Produces and markets OJ None (+)
 CHB Foods Produces and markets pet food, fish, vegetables and fruit None
 Castle & Cooke Produces and markets pineapples, bananas, fish, broccoli, Positive
 sugar; Owns Hawaii land
 Consolidated Foods Manufactures and distributes coffee, candy, sugar, soft drinks Positive
 Curtice-Burns Processes and packs fruits and vegetables, soft drinks, None
 Mexican food, frozen vegetables
 Del Monted Produces fresh bananas and pineapples; processes seafood None
 Di Giorgio Diversified food processor including citrus, Italian food, None
 sells OJ in Europe; Has some Fl. land
 Green Giant d Produces canned and frozen vegetables None
 Norton Simon Produces tomato-based food products, popcorn, None (-)
 cooking oil, liquor
 Orange-Co. Inc. Owns 8100 acres of Fl. citrus; Produces and markets OJ None
 J. M. Smucker Produces jellies, condiments, syrups, and canned fruit drinks None (-)
 Stokeley Van Camp Produces Gatorade and canned and frozen vegetables None
 Tropicanad Processes citrus juice; Owns a few Fl. groves Negative
 which are experimental plantings
 United Foods Produces frozen vegetables None
 aEquities with the standard industrial classification of food manufacturers and processors with the same four-digit
 SIC codes as Di Giorgio, Orange-Co. or Tropicana, and with at least 100 daily return observations in the period
 October 1975-December 1981.
 bIn addition to these companies, regressions were also run with soft drink equities, Coca-Cola, Dr. Pepper, MEI,
 Pepsi Cola, and Royal Crown. None of these regressions were significant.
 c"Positive" or "Negative" indicates that the regression's F-statistic was significant at the 5 percent level. The
 regression's dependent variable is the equity's return and independent variables are two leading, contemporaneous,
 and two lagged orange juice futures returns plus corresponding slope dummies for limit moves. A symbol in
 parentheses indicates a marginally significant regression (at the 10 percent level).
 d Companies no longer listed on the New York or American Exchange.
 code as Di Giorgio, Tropicana, or Orange-
 Co., three companies known in advance to
 be in the orange juice business.) All such
 companies are listed by name in Table 11.
 The second type of company produced
 soft drinks (see Table 11, fn. b). No soft
 drink producer had a significant relation to
 orange juice. So changes in OJ demand due
 to changes in soft drink prices are not
 revealed in the data.26
 Turning back to the first type of firm,
 Table 11 indicates that many were not re-
 lated to OJ prices. This was true even for
 such companies as Orange-Co., whose prin-
 cipal business is growing oranges and pro-
 ducing juice. There are several possible
 explanations for the lack of significant co-
 movement in such a firm. First, consider the
 impact of supply shocks: an increase in OJ
 prices due to, say, cold weather, would not
 affect the firm if the gain in the value of its
 Florida land were offset by a reduction in the
 value of its processing and distribution divi-
 sions, or if the firm had hedged its own
 supply by selling OJ futures.
 A demand shock, however, should affect
 the firm unequivocally unless it overhedged
 in the futures market. For example, an exog-
 enous increase in OJ demand raises the value
 of its land and, if there are fixed costs, also
 raises the value of its production and distri-
 bution facilities. Thus, the lack of significant
 comovement between OJ prices and firms
 such as Orange-Co., Di Giorgio, and Amer-
 26One of these companies, Coca-Cola, also produces
 orange juice, so a lack of comovement due to shifts in
 prices of orange juice substitutes might be expected for
 this particular firm; roughly, what it gains in the soft
 drink business might be lost in the orange juice business,
 or vice versa.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.159 on Fri, 26 Apr 2019 21:56:38 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL. 74 NO. S ROLL: ORANGE JUICE AND WEATHER 879
 ican Agronomics, who grow and process
 juice, suggests that most of the OJ price
 volatility is due to supply shocks instead of
 demand shocks.
 This is reinforced by the case of Tropicana,
 a processor owning virtually no land. It is
 the only such firm and also the only firm
 whose equity comoves negatively and signifi-
 cantly with OJ prices. It is conceivable, of
 course, that this negative relation is induced
 by a combination of demand shocks and
 Tropicana purchasing too many futures con-
 tracts (more than its own anticipated re-
 quirements), but it seems more plausible
 that the relation is induced directly by sup-
 ply shocks that squeeze Tropicana's profit
 margin.
 Two companies, Castle & Cooke and Con-
 solidated Foods, produce OJ substitutes and
 have positive comovement with OJ prices (as
 is expected if OJ prices move because of
 supply shocks). One firm, Smucker, buys
 oranges for jam and has a marginally nega-
 tive comovement (also explainable by OJ
 supply shocks). The only anomalous firm is
 Norton Simon, a producer of substitutes such
 as tomato juice and liquor (but its negative
 comovement is of only marginal significance).
 Some wits have suggested that Norton-Simon
 actually produces a complement, not a sub-
 stitute, product. Vodka, one of its biggest
 sellers, is often consumed with orange juice.
 Overall, the evidence in Table 11 supports
 the view that supply shocks are the principal
 cause of OJ price movements. Unfortunately,
 the identity of such shocks remains at least a
 partial mystery. Weather is important, but
 measured weather explains only a small frac-
 tion of the volatility in OJ prices.
 III. Summary and Conclusion
 The market price of frozen concentrated
 orange juice is affected by the weather, par-
 ticularly by cold temperatures. A statistically
 significant relation was found between OJ
 returns and subsequent errors in temperature
 forecasts issued by the National Weather
 Service for the central Florida region where
 most juice oranges are grown. Orange juice
 prices are much less related to errors in
 rainfall prediction. Indeed, no significant
 statistical association was found between
 these variables.
 The OJ futures price is rendered informa-
 tionally inefficient by the existence of ex-
 change-imposed limits on price movements.
 This inefficiency manifests itself in the data
 by allowing temperature surprises to have
 apparent predictive power for later price
 changes. When limit moves are taken into
 account, however, temperature has no re-
 maining predictive content.
 There is, nevertheless, a puzzle in the OJ
 futures market. Even though weather is the
 most obvious and significant influence on the
 orange crop, weather surprises explain only a
 small fraction of the observed variability in
 futures prices. The importance of weather is
 confirmed by the fact that it is the most
 frequent topic of stories concerning oranges
 in the financial press and by the ancillary
 fact that other topics are associated with
 even less price variability than is weather.
 Possible sources of orange juice demand
 and supply movements such as substitute
 product prices, general demand, export de-
 mand, and production costs were also ex-
 amined here. Yet no factor was identified
 that can explain more than a small part of
 the daily price movement in orange juice
 futures. There is a large amount of inexplica-
 ble price volatility.
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